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INVESTMENT quality is an elusive concept, as is investor experi-
ence. Neither can be defined precisely because of the multiplicity
of investor preferences. Since different investors have different
objectives, securities suitable for one portfolio may be entirely
unsuitable for another. Small investors are unable to diversify
against the risk of default and must seek to obtain securities
that are individually "safe" if they are to avoid ruinous default
losses. Large investors may be less directly concerned with the
riskiness of individual investments because of the possibility of
averaging capital gains and losses, but are frequently restricted
by various legal or self-imposed constraints designed to avoid
areas of excessively high default risk. Some investors, and they
may be large or small, require liquidity in the bond account and
therefore seek salability and price stability. Others, such as life
insurance companies, may have little interest in liquidity per Se,
if the net flow of funds available for investment is regularly in
their favor or if the contracts running against them are typically
long term. These are but a few possibilities; the variety of in-
vestment objectives is endless. It follows that no single index
of investment quality, and no single measure of investment ex-
perience, can be equally relevant to all investors.
In exploring the relationships between bond quality and in-
vestor experience, a practical approach must be taken to these
matters. Although not all investors have the same requirements,
most of them do utilize similar measures, or standards, of quality
when selecting corporate bond investments. These measures are
essentially devices for ranking fixed-income securities in order
of the prospective risk of default. From the statistical point of
view, the problem is to classify securities by the various measures
of prospective quality in common use, and to determine retro-
speciively the actual performance of the securities in each class
—taking into account not only rate of default but also rate of
loss and realized rate of return.
STATISTICAL MEASURES OF BOND QUALITY
AND INVESTOR EXPERIENCE
The most general measures of prospective quality that we have
examined are the ratings assigned by the investment agencies,4 iNTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY
selected state lists of bonds eligible for savings bank investment,
and a market rating especially constructed for this report from
price quotations. Other specific characteristics of bond issues di-
rectly or indirectly related to bond quality in the prospective
sense are also examined: the margin of safety (ratio of net income
to gross income of the companies offering the bonds), the times-
charges-earned ratio (ratio of income before fixed charges to
charges), the lien position, the size of issue, and the asset size of
obligor.
The most popular measures of prospective bond quality are
the ratings assigned by the four investment agencies: Moody's,
Fitch, Standard Statistics, and Poor's (the latter two were merged
in 1941 and issued a single rating thereafter). Since there is. a
fair degree of uniformity among the ratings assigned by the in-
vestment agencies, it is possible to combine them into a single
composite, which typifies the ratings assigned by the individual
agencies. The composite rating used in this report is a median
of individual coded ratings, where the rating i was assigned to the
best grade under each system (i.e., Moody's Aaa, Standard Sta-
tistics A1+, etc.); the rating iitothe next best grade (Moody's
Aa, Standard's Al, etc.); and so on. Issues having composite grades
i—iv in this system are usually considered to be of investment grade;
that is, they are eligible for commercial bank investment, are
fully "amortizable" for life insurance companies (are permitted
to be carried on the companies' books at full amortized book
value), etc. The lower grades (v—ix) are considered to be predomi-
nantly speculative by most investors.
The legal selections analyzed in this report consist of corporate
bonds listed among eligible investments for savings banks in
Maine, Massachusetts, and New York. The laws. of those states
were prototypes for other states, and their published lists were
available for much of the period covered by our special records.
Although the prestige of the legal lists has suffered in recent years,
they are still consulted by many investors outside the savings bank
field. Aside from exemptions now provided by so-called "basket
provisions" in the laws of most of the states, savings banks must
select their corporate bond investments from securities on the
legal lists. The same is true of trust funds in New York State,
unless the donor or testator specifically exempts the trustee from
that restriction.
The market place also, through its daily quotations, is continu-INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY 5
ously engaged in the process of ranking corporate bonds in order
of prospective quality. The market rating used to reflect this
ranking is simply the yield spread, or algebraic difference be-
tween the yield promised to maturity on a particular security,
on a certain date, and the yield promised on the very best cor-
porate bonds then outstanding with the same term to maturity.
Thus if a given bond issue maturing in, say, twenty years sold
on a particular date to yield 5 percent, and the yield on the "best"
(lowest yielding) twenty-year maturities outstanding was then
4 percent, the market rating assigned to the issue was 1 percent.
Roughly speaking, the market rating is the risk premium in yield
discussed by Alfred Marshall, A. C. Pigou, F. Lavington, and
other neoclassical economists.
These and other prospective measures of bond quality were
compared with various measures of investor experience: default
rates, realized yields, and loss rates. The latter are in effect retro-
spective measures of bond quality, i.e., measures of quality as
judged by past performance. Each of the measures was calculated
for the entire group of bonds studied and for subgroups over
selected assumed investment periods.
The field of investigation is the universe of straight corporate
bonds offered during 1900—1943, including those outstanding on
January 1, 1900. Straight corporate bonds are defined as fixed-
income, single-maturity bonds offered by domestic business cor-
porations and held by the domestic investing public. The study
covers all large straight issues (those with total offerings of $5
million or more) of railroad, public utility, and industrial cor-
porations, and a representative 10 percent sample of small straight
issues (under $5 million). Excluded are real estate mortgage bonds
(principally issues secured by office buildings and residential prop-
erty) and bonds of financial corporations.
Life-span default rates, showing the proportions of the par-
amount totals of bond offerings in the different quality classes at
offering that went into default at any time between offering and
extinguishment, were calculated for all large issues and for the
sample of small issues. In addition, default rates were calculated
for issues outstanding over selected chronological periods. The
periodic default rates represent the proportions of the par-amount
totals of included issues outstanding at the beginning of the
selected periods, classified by prospective quality at that time,
that went into default before the end of those periods. The pe-6 INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY
nods studied comprise all eleven of the four-year intervals, 1900—
1903, 1904—07, and so on, and nine longer periods. The periodic
default rates serve as a useful check on the life-span default rates,
and have the additional advantage of showing the comparative
performance of issues in different quality classes under identical
economic conditions.
The other basic measures of investor experience consist of the
realized yield and the loss rate, the latter obtained by subtracting
the realized yield from the yield promised at the beginning of
the investment period. The promised yield is the yield that would
be obtained by the investor under the bond contract if the issu.e
were paid in full at maturity with no prior delay in the payment
of interest; it is the one given in ordinary bond values tables.
The realized yield, like the promised yield, is computed at com-
pound interest but takes into account dates and amounts of ac-
tual payments received by the investor.
Although in computing the promised yield it is assumed that
the bond will be paid in full at maturity, by the end of 1943 this
was true of only slightly over 10 percent of the par amount of all
issues studied (i.e., outstanding in 1900 or offered 1900—1943). For
that 10 percent the yield realized from offering to extinguishment
was the same as the promised yield, and the loss rate was zero.
The remaining issues were either called, went into default, or
were still outstanding on January 1, 1944 with no prior delay in
the payment of interest. For such issues, the realized yield gen-
erally exceeded or fell short of the promised yield, depending
upon whether the issue was called, defaulted, or was selling at
the end of the period studied above or below the investors' amor-
tized book value. (The realized yield on bonds outstanding on
January 1, 1944 is defined as the yield that would have been real-
ized if the bonds had been sold at that time.)
The loss rate is a derived measure obtained by subtracting the
realized yield from the promised yield. Although calculated in
•hat way, for some purposes it is more conveniently thought of
'ian adjustment factor applied to the promised yield to obtain
realized yield. Usually, the life-span loss rate is positive for
iulted bonds (indicating a capital loss), zero for bonds paid
at maturity, and negative (indicating a capital gain) for
called at a premium or extinguished by other contractual
Is such as conversion. The loss rate is the retrospective
of the market rating in that it is what the market rat-INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY 7
ing would have been if investors had possessed perfect foresight
at offering.1
For broad aggregates the coverage of the yield data was very
good. Complete information needed to compute promised yields,
realized yields, and loss rates could be obtained for over 97 per-
cent of the par-amount total of offerings of the large issues, and
for about two-thirds of the corresponding total for the small is-
sues in the 10 percent sample. As would be expected, the coverage
was better for some periods than others, and for large issues in
which there was a broad public interest than for small issues and
direct placements. There was no pronounced trend in coverage
over the full period studied, since improved reporting on pub-
licly placed issues was offset in the late thirties and early forties
by the growth of private placements.
AGGREGATE EXPERIENCE
Before considering the detailed records relating to the default
and yield experience of bonds in different quality classes, several
points about aggregate behavior are worth noting. Since the basic
records cover virtually all large issues offered and outstanding
during the period studied, and a large sample of small issues
(which were adjusted by weighting to cover all small issues), the
aggregates reflect accurately the over-all experience of investors
holding corporate bonds.
During the period 1900—1943, $71.5 billion par amount of
straight bonds of domestic corporations were offered to and ac-
quired by the investing public. Of that amount 93 percent con-
sisted of regular offerings; the remaining 7 percent, of contract
modifications and exchanges growing out of corporate reorganiza-
tions. The latter, called irregular offerings in this report, initially
sold at extremely high promised yields (12.3 percent on the aver-
age), but the yields actually realized from offering to extinguish-
ment were even higher (13.7 percent), so that investors holding
them obtained average capital gains of 1.4 percent per annum. The
98 percent of regular offerings breaks down into 12 percent paid
in full at maturity, 37 percent called, 18 percent defaulted, and
26 percent outstanding on January 1, 1944 with a perfect con-
tractual record through that date. The zero loss rate on the issues
1 The concepts of default rates, loss rates, and promised and realized yields,
with other definitional matters, are discussed fully in Chapter 1 (pages 41-43
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paid in full at maturity has been mentioned(realized yield
equaled promised yield). On the defaulted issues the average life-
span loss rate was 3.7 percent. But the remarkable fact is that
capital losses on defaulted issues were just offset by capital gains
on irregular offerings and on regular offerings called or selling
in 1944 above amortized book value. The weighted average prom-
ised and realized yields on total offerings both worked out at 5.6
percent, so that for the universe of corporate bonds the net loss
rate was zero. This finding is a tribute to the ability of domestic
business corporations to service their long-term obligations in a
turbulent period of forty-four years during which there was a
great war, a great depression, and the start of a second great war.
It may, of course, be objected that the purchasing power of the
dollar based on consumer prices shrank by about one-quarter be-
tween the entry of the United States into World War I and the
close of the period under investigation.(Based on wholesale
prices, the purchasing power of the dollar actually increased over
that period; the great decline in the value of the dollar after
World War II came too late to affect our study.) With respect
to price changes generally, however, it should be noted that cor-
porate bonds are held largely by institutional investors having
fixed-dollar claims running against them. Such institutions are
not directly affected by changes in the purchasing power of the
dollar, aside from secondary effects on costs of operation. Their
owners or beneficiaries,are,of course, most vitally affected.
Unusual economic developments during the years
also raise questions as to the representativeness of the period stud-
ied. Although the loss rate was zero on corporate bonds over the
full period, it was definitely not zero for most of the subperiods.
Since our records terminate on January 1, 1944, they are heavily
weighted by the catastrophic default rates of the Great Depres-
sion. For analytical purposes, however, this may be a virtue rather
than a weakness since it permits an examination of the behavior
of corporate bonds under the most adverse circumstances. Cor-
porate bonds have been virtually default-free since World War
II, so that if the record were extended up to the present it would
show realized yields above promised yields and net capital gains
on bonds offered since 1900. Barring another major depression,
our estimate of a zero loss rate on corporate bonds held from
offering to extinguishment is a conservative one.
Within the full period studied, marked discrepancies occurred
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in the yields and loss rates on bonds offered and extinguished in
different periods. Generally speaking, experience was best with
bonds offered and extinguished before, say, 1932, and with bonds
offered and extinguished thereafter; it was poorest with bonds of-
fered before 1932 and still outstanding on that date, so that they
were exposed to the heavy default risks of the Great Depression.
For example, of the total par amount of large issues offered and
extinguished during 1900—1931, 83 percent was called or paid in
full at maturity, and 17 percent defaulted. For that period, pre-
miums obtained on called bonds more than offset losses suffered
on defaulted bonds, so that the weighted average realized yield
was 6.4 percent versus a yield of 6.2 percent promised at offering;
that is, investors obtained life-span capital gains of 0.2 percent
per annum. The record was similar for bonds offered and extin-
guished in the period 1932—43. Of that group, 96 percent (by
volume) was called or paid in full at maturity, and only 4 per-
cent defaulted. The average realized yield on such issues was 6.0
percent versus a promised yield of 4.9 percent, so that investors,
on the whole, obtained capital gains at the rate of 1.1 percent
per annum. This is in sharp contrast to the experience record of
bonds offered in the period 1900—1931 and extinguished during
1932—43, which shows only 77 percent called or paid in full at
maturity, and 23 percent defaulted. The weighted average yield
promised at offering on those investments was 5.4 percent versus
a yield realized of only 4.6 percent, so that in the aggregate inves-
tors suffered losses at the rate of 0.8 percent annually.
Throughout the study, realized yields and loss rates were sig-
nificantly affected by default and call experience, both for bonds
offered and extinguished in different periods, and for outstanding
issues held over assumed chronological investment periods. Gen-
erally speaking, during periods of rising interest rates few issues
were called, and capital gains obtained through call premiums
were insufficient to offset default losses. Contrariwise, in periods
of falling interest rates many issues were called, and although de-
fault losses were occasionally heavy, they were usually more than
offset by call premiums. Aggregate experience on corporate bonds
is therefore particularly sensitive to the trend of interest rates
over the period of investment, and to the business cycle and
other factors affecting default experience.10 INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY
BEHAVIOR OF CORPORATE BONDS IN
DIFFERENT QUALITY CLASSES
When investor experience is examined in the light of prospective
measures of quality assigned at the beginning of investment pe-
riods, several typical patterns emerge, along with a number of
interesting differences, as the selections of different rating systems
are compared. The typical or basic patterns of behavior are quite
pronounced throughout the data. Let us turn to them first, be-
fore exploring the differences.
Typical Patterns of Corporate Bond Behavior
A few summary statistics pertaining to the behavior of straight
corporate bonds classified by the more important measures of
prospective quality at offering are brought together in Table 1.
TABLE 1—Life-span Default Rates, Yields, and Loss Rates for
Bonds Classified by Industry, Quality, and Other Charac-
teristics at Offering, 1900—1943
DefaultPromisedRealized Loss
Rate Yield Yield Rate
All Industries 17.3% 5.3% 5.4%—0.1%
Railroads 28.1 5.5 5.2 0.3
Public utilities 10.6 5.0 5.4 —0.4
Industrials 14.8 5.4 5.8 —0.4
Agency Rating
I 5.9 4.5 5.1 —0.6
II 6.0 4.6 5.0 —0.4
III 13.4 4.9 5.0 —0.1
IV 19.1 5.4 5.7 —0.3
V-TX 42.4 9.5 8.6 0.9
No rating 28.6 4.8 4.6 0.2
Legal Status
Legal in Maine 7.1 4.0 4.9 —0.9
Not legal in Maine 19.2 5.5 5.5 0.0
Legal in Massachusetts 7.6 4.0 4.7 —0.7
Not legal in Massachusetts 18.5 5.4 5.5 —0.1
Legal in New York 9.0 4.0 4.5 —0.5
Notlegal in New York 18.8 5.5 5.5 0.0TABLE 1
(concluded)
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DefaultPromisedRealized Loss
Rate Yield Yield Rate
Market Rating
Under 10.5% 3.8% 3.9%—0.1%
Y2—1 13.9 4.5 4.7 —0.2
1—2 20.7 5.4 5.5 —0.1
2%andover 32.4 9.3 9.5 —0.2
Times- Charges-Earned Ratio
3.Oandover 2.1 4.0 4.9 —0.9
2.0—2.9 4.0 4.3 5.1 —0.8
1.5—1.9 17.9 4.7 5.0 —0.3
1.0—1.4 34.1 6.8 6.4 0.4
Under1.0 35.0 6.2 6.0 0.2
Ratio of Net Income
to Gross Income
25%andover 3.3 4.5 5.0 —0.5
20—24 11.6 4.6 4.6 0.0
15—19 12.7 4.4 4.8 —0.4
10—14 17.6 5.1 5.3 —0.2
Under 10% 27.5 5.0 5.0 0.0
Negative 17.2 8.9 10.7 —1.8
Lien Position
Secured 18.8 5.3 5.4 —0.1
Unsecured 13.6 5.3 5.3 0.0
Size of Issue
$50million and over 16.3 4.9 5.0 —0.!
20—49 16.4 5.2 5.7 —0.5
5—19 19.0 5.7 5.5 0.2
Under$5 million 24.9 6.3 6.1 0.2
A sset Size of Obligor
$200 million and over 16.4 5.4 5.3 0.1
100—199 17.0 5.0 5.8 —0.8
5—99 18.8 5.6 5.7 —0.1
Under$5 million 23.6 6.6 6.6 0.0
From Tables ii, 33, 39, 47, 51, 60, 66, 84, 85, 89, 90, 93, 98, 105, 106, 109,
111, and special supplementary tabulations. Data for size of issue and asset
size of obligor are based on large issues ($5 million and over) and an adjusted
10 percent sample of small issues; data for other classifications are for large
issues only. Default rates exclude irregular offerings (made during corporate
reorganizations, etc.). For further explanation of the varying coverage of the
data in the several classifications, see the tables referred to.12 iNTRODUCTiON AND SUMMARY
The first column contains life-span default rates by composite
agency rating at offering, legal status at offering, and other qual-
ity measures. As has been indicated, life-span default rates are
retrospective measures of quality: they represent the proportion
of the par-amount total of bond offerings in each of the prospec-
tive quality classes that went into default at any time between
offering and extinguishment.
Even the highest grades of corporate bonds, it is shown, were
not entirely free of the risk of default; but virtually all of the
prospective measures of quality provided reliable rankings in
regard to such risk. In other words, the retrospective quality of
bond offerings as measured by default rates declines as we move
down the scale of each of the major prospective measures of qual-
ity. The inverse relationship between prospective quality and
default rates held almost uniformly throughout the indicated
classes of the table for agency ratings, legal status, market rat-
ings, time-charges-earned ratios, ratios of net income to gross
income, size of issue, and asset size of obligor. The results thus
provide confirmation of the reasonableness of the quality meas-
ures generally used by investors in selecting corporate bond in-
vestments. The similarity of the patterns of default experience
when classified by the major quality measures arises largely from
the fact that the same basic information is utilized under each of
the rating systems. That is to say, the investment agencies, the
legal lists, and the market typically assigned high rankings to the
large issues of large obligors on which fixed charges were earned
a large number of times at offering. Although the weights as-
signed to the different elements of bond quality are not the same
under each system, subsequent chapters demonstrate that there
is reasonable agreement among them as to the basic elements of
strength.
One of the most significant points brought out by the table
is the marked difference among major industry groups in life-
span default rates on their bond offerings. The rails had the poor-
est record in that respect, although, as subsequent chapters in-
dicate, the investment agencies, legal lists, and market all favored
the rails at offering. In consequence, the default rates for bond
offerings classified within industry by the various quality measures
are usually more closely associated with quality than the figures
for the combined industries indicate. The same is true for out-
standing issues held over assumed chronological investment pe-iNTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY 13
nods. As a general rule, the various rating systems were efficient
in ranking issues within industry but were less successful in judg-
ing default risks as between major industry groups.
The picture presented by the comprehensive data of the table
is also clouded by the lumping together of bonds offered and
extinguished in different periods. The frequency of default is
closely associated with general business conditions, both with
the short-run ups and downs of business and with the major in-
vestment cycle of the nineteen twenties and thirties. Since default
rates differ so greatly for bonds offered and extinguished in dif-
ferent periods, and for bonds held over different chronological
investment periods, the pooling of data for the full period stud-
ied obscures the underlying relationship between prospective and
retrospective quality. In general, the relationship between qual-
ity and default risk is much sharper when we examine issues
of a given industry held over uniform investment periods. Within
industry, and for issues held over similar investment periods, the
rating systems were quite accurate in ranking issues in order of
default risk. The principal errors of judgment committed by the
rating systems arose from a failure to appraise accurately the
earnings trends of the different industries and to allow fully for
cyclical risks.
An inverse relationship to quality also appears among the
yields promised at offering for bonds classified by the various
quality measures, although again the relationship is blurred to
some extent by the lumping together of data for different indus-
tries and for different investment periods. As would be expected,
the yield promised the investor at offering, which is itself a rough
measure of prospective quality, rises as other quality measures
decline. Changes in the industry preferences of investors, and
trends and cycles in the level and structure of interest rates and
bond yields, tend to obscure the inverse relationship between
quality and promised yield in the aggregate data, but the rela-
tionship is so strong that they do not obliterate it.
One of the most significant questions to be answered from
materials of this type is the relationship between the prospective
measures of quality at offering (and at the beginning of assumed
chronological investment periods) and the yields actually realized
by investors. Realized yields, it will be recalled, exceeded prom-
ised yields for bonds extinguished by call(principally high
grades), and fell short of them for bonds extinguished after de-14 INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY
fault (principally low grades). Since promised yields and default
losses both rise as quality declines, the one partially offsets the
other. What, then, is the observed relationship between prospec-
tive quality and the yields actually obtained by investors after
full allowance is made for capital gains and losses?
The table indicates a clear-cut, long-run relationship between
bond quality at offering and the yields actually obtained by in-
vestors. On the average and over long periods, the life-span
yields realized on high-grade bonds were below those on low-
grade bonds, with the result that investors, in the aggregate, ob-
tained better returns on the low grades. The inverse relationship
between prospective quality and realized return was not so pro-
nounced, however, as that between quality and promised yield
or between quality and default risk. As a result, the loss rate (dif-
ference between promised and realized yields) rose for succes-
sively lower grades of bonds and even turned from negative to
positive for some quality measures. On high-grade bonds, capital
gains from call premiums were fairly general; and on low-grade
bonds, either lower capital gains or capital losses from defaulted
issues.
The foregoing may be summarized as follows: (1) Investors,
in the aggregate, paid lower prices for, and thus exacted higher
promised yields on, the low-grade issues; (2) default rates on the
low grades were higher than on the high grades; (3) loss rates,
which take into account not only default losses but also capital
gains, were higher on low-grade issues; (4) the higher promised
returns exacted on the low grades at offering proved to be more
than sufficient to offset the higher default losses; (5) in conse-
quence, life-span yields realized on low grades were higher than
on high grades. The results were quite typical within major in-
dustry groups. Similar results were obtained for most of the
longer assumed chronological investment periods.
The major conclusion that investors obtained higher returns
on low-grade issues than on high grades should not be accepted
without proper qualification. For it cannot be emphasized too
strongly that this finding emerges only when broad aggregates
of corporate bonds are considered over long investment periods,
and given the price and yield relationships that existed during
those periods. In effect, the aggregate results reflect the experi-
ence of all investors over long periods, rather than that of any
particular investor over any given short period. Another quali-INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY 15
fication is that realized yields and loss rates were not nearly so
regularly related to quality as were promised yields and default
rates. Because of the disparity in the performance of low-grade
bonds, small investors (and many large investors that may have
been inhibited from practicing the broadest type of diversifica-
tion) would frequently have fared best by holding only the high-
est grade obligations. This conclusion follows both from the
higher average default rate on low-grade securities and from the
wider scatter of realized yields obtained on them over given
periods. A third qualification is that realized yields were sub-
ject to extreme aberrations over time, since they reflected not
only the risks of the business cycle but the state of the capital
market as well. The average yields realized over selected periods
of offering and extinguishment, or over selected chronological
periods during which the issues were outstanding, indicate that
the market usually overpriced low-grade issues (and underesti-
mated default risks) at or near peaks of major investment cycles.
As a general rule, low grades fared better than high grades when
purchased near troughs and sold near peaks of the investment
cycle; but by the same token, losses were heavy on low grades
purchased near peaks and sold near troughs. The same is true
of investments in declining as against growing industries. Low-
grade issues of a declining industry rarely worked out as well as
high-grade issues.
The finding that realized returns were higher on low-quality
corporate bond issues than on high-quality issues has implications
for investment theory as well as for practical investment policy.
The result appears consistent with either of two views of the fac-
tors involved in the formulation of promised yields. One is the
neoclassical economists' conception that promised yields con-
tain three roughly additive components: the basic yield on the
highest grade of bonds outstanding with similar maturities; a
pure risk premium, sufficient, when averaged over a large number
of similar obligations, to offset net default losses; and a compo-
nent for risk bearing. The other view is based largely on insti-
tutional considerations.
The concept of a premium for risk bearing, which would ex-
plain the higher returns actually obtained on low-grade issues,
implies that investors are unable to diversify adequately to aver-
age out default losses. This concept would appear to fit best
an atomistic market comprised of a large number of small in-16 iNTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY
vestors. For, if all investors had sufficient funds at their disposal
to average out default risk, there would be no need of a com-
ponent for risk bearing, except possibly for the extra costs in-
curred in servicing a high risk portfolio. From materials avail-
able on corporate bond outstandings, and from balance sheet
records of institutional holdings, it appears that the corporate
bond market has been dominated for at least the last quarter
century by large investment intermediaries. Such investors, who
through their bidding largely determine the prices and prom-
ised yields of corporate bonds, are able to diversify adequately
and thus do not require a specific premium for risk bearing. The
investment intermediaries, are, however, closely regulated as to
the type and quality of securities that may be purchased, and
their investment officers, through their close ties with the gen-
eral public and their directors, would be embarrassed if their
portfolios contained a large volume of defaulted obligations, even
though no loss should ultimately result. As a general rule, in-
stitutional investors are fairly conservative and place a premium
on quality, just as do small investors who seek to avoid ruinous
default losses through the purchase of high-grade bonds. The
result is that promised yields on low grades—averaged over long
investment periods—are more than sufficient to offset default
losses, so that realized yields on low grades are high. These insti-
tutional considerations rest on personal observation rather than
on statistical evidence; but either view—the neoclassical or the
institutional—is consistent with the record, and indeed both may
be partially correct.
Before leaving the table, two final points deserve comment. One
is that the secured issues (issues secured by mortgage, collateral,
or leasehold) behaved more nearly like low grades during the
period studied than did unsecured issues (debentures). For the
combined industries this is evident only in the life-span default
rates, but within major industry groups promised and realized
yields were higher on secured issues. The principal reason why
unsecured issues behaved more nearly like high than low grades
is that usually only the best credit risks could float debentures
during the period under review; among corporations whose future
earnings were doubtful, investors looked to a lien, on assets for
protection in possible default situations. In consequence, earnings
protection was frequently less for secured issues, and they wentINTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY 17
into default more frequently than unsecured issues, but provided
slightly higher realized returns.
The second point is that large issues and issues of large obligors
behaved more nearly like high grades than small issues and issues
of small obligors (the two size measures are, of course, inter-
related). The market generally, along with the rating agencies
and the legal lists, has shown a preference for the power and fi-
nancial strength of large corporations and for the liquidity of
large issues. Promised yields and market ratings were therefore
lower for large issues and for issues of large ob.ligors than for
other issues. As the table shows, default rates and loss rates were
also lower for the large size groups than the small; the market's
preferences were justified by experience. On the other hand, de-
fault losses on the small size groups. were not sufficiently high to
offset the higher yields promised at offering so that realized re-
turns were larger on the smaller issues and issues of small obligors.
In general, therefore, issues in the high-quality classes (including
large issues of large obligors) had the lowest default rates, prom-
ised yields, and loss rates; but the returns obtained by those who
held them over long periods were generally below those on low-
grade issues.
Comparative Experience
In analyzing the comparative experience of corporate bonds as
appraised by the different prospective quality measures, particu-
lar attention was given to selected groups of high grades: namely,
issues in the first four agency rating grades; those on the legal lists
of Maine, Massachusetts, and New York; and equivalent lists of
high grades selected by means of the market rating. Such issues
are not only conceived of as high grade by most investors, but at
one time or another have been eligible for investment by financial
intermediaries under various state and federal laws and have been
fully amortizable for valuation purposes. Since default rates are
generally lower the more restrictive the list of investments, analyti-
cal adjustments were made in so far as possible for differences in
the volume of securities meeting the different tests. For example,
in comparing the experience record of issues rated in the first
four grades by the investment agencies with those rated high grade
by the market, the issues were arrayed from highest to lowest
grade by market rating and the best issues having a par-amount18 INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY
volume approximately equal to those rated i—Iv by the agencies
were compared with the latter group.
Several interesting differences were revealed by these compari-
sons. For most of the chronological periods studied, the market
was less stable than either the agency ratings or the legal lists, in
the sense that the proportion of the total volume of outstanding
issues rated high grade by the market at the beginning of a given
period that was still so rated at the end of that period was below
the corresponding proportion based on legal bonds and agency
ratings. Since the market rating is extremely sensitive to bond
market conditions, this type of standard has been subject to fre-
quent revisions when it has been used officially for the regulation
of institutional investments.
Being so sensitive, the market rating usually reflects changes in
the credit standing of obligors more promptly than other ratings
do. As a result, default rates over four-year periods were usually
lower for high-grade outstandings selected by market rating than
for equal volumes of high grades selected by agency rating or legal
status. Life-span experience on bond offerings showed just the re-
verse: defaults were heavier among the market-selected high grades
than among equal volumes rated high grade by the agencies or in-
cluded on the legal lists. The reason again is the extreme sensi-
tivity, amounting almost to instability, of the market rating to
changing conditions, with the result that a fixed market-rating
standard applied at offering picks up a disproportionately large
volume of offerings in years of market optimism and a dispro-
portionately small volume in years of market pessimism. Since
bonds offered in years of market optimism fared worse than those
offered in other years, life-span default rates were higher on offer-
ings selected by a fixed market-rating applied to all offerings over
the full period studied than on offerings selected by agency rating.
The same proves true of the market rating versus the legal lists,
when allowance is made for the large volume of rail bonds on the
lists of the three states investigated. The instability of the market
rating over time and its accuracy in predicting default risk at a
given instant are brought out by the fact that outstanding issues
had lower default rates over four-year periods when selected by
the market rating than by other quality measures. The market
rating was also a more accurate predictor of life-span default risk
than other quality measures when applied annually to offerings
rather than as a fixed standard over the full period studied. OurINTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY 19
conclusion, therefore, is that the market rating was unstable over
time, but was an efficient device for ranking offerings and out-
standings at any given moment in order of the risk of subsequent
default.
Similar but opposite patterns were observed in the realized
yields on equally inclusive lists of securities selected by means of
the three rating systems. With regard to the behavior of outstand-
ing issues over selected chronological periods, the very fact that
the market was the most efficient selector of issues with low de-
fault risk worked against it as a selector from the standpoint of
realized returns. Risk premiums in promised yields were smaller
for high-grade market-rating lists than for other equal-volume lists
of high-grade investments, so that realized yields obtained over as-
sumed chronological investment periods were usually less for the
market selections than for the other lists. An analysis based on
corporate bond offerings since 1920 reveals a similar pattern for
high grades selected by a fixed market-rating standard. Again, the
market rating was unstable. The bond market was excessively
bouyant in the late twenties, so that a list selected to meet a fixed
market-rating standard was heavily weighted in favor of the offer-
ings of that period. Since many of these offerings later went into de-
fault, the average life-span yield realized was lower for the market-
rating group than for the other lists, and the average loss rate was
higher.
Comparisons of equal-volume lists of high-grade bonds based
on legal status and agency ratings reveal little of statistical or
practical significance. The data suggest that the investment agen-
cies may have been slightly more sensitive to impending defaults
than the legal lists (possibly because of the heavy bias of the latter
towards rails), but neither of these two systems of security selec-
tion was markedly superior to the other, either in this or in other
respects.
BEHAVIOR OF DEFAULTED BONDS
One of the most persistent and most pronounced phenomena ob-
served in the data is the propensity of the market to undervalue
corporate bonds at or near the date of default. Two results flow
immediately from this finding. One is that capital losses were ex-
tremely heavy on bonds that were purchased at offering and sold
at default. The other is that returns were equally large to investors
who purchased at default and held until the issue was extin-20 INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY
guished. Summary statistics bearing on this matter are shown in
Table 2.
The average yield promised at date of first offering on all large
corporate bonds that went into default was 6.4 percent, versus a
yield realized from offering to default of minus 3.4 percent. That
is to say, investors unfortunate enough to purchase bonds that
later went into default and to liquidate them at default obtained
an annual return 9.8 percent less than the yield promised at offer-
ing. This represents the annual rate of capital loss on bonds amor-
tized at the promised yield of 6.4 percent and sold at date of de-
fault. The table shows roughly similar results throughout each
of the major industry groups. On the other hand, yields realized
on bonds purchased at default and held to extinguishment were
usually attractive, averaging 20 percent per annum for the corn.-
bined industries, 17 percent for public utilities, 19 percent for rails,
and 26 percent for industrials. Because of the rapid recovery of
bonds after default, the loss rate on defaulted obligations held from
offering to extinguishment averaged far below that on bonds sold
at default, and the return realized turned from negative to positive.
It is interesting to note that life-span yields realized on defaulted
bonds over the period studied were not far below the yields prom-
ised on some of the best bonds offered in the forties and early
fifties. The detailed default records show that the largest losses
occurred on bonds sold during the depressed thirties (and the
largest gains, on those purchased then); but the phenomenon of
unduly depressed prices at date of default is observable in other
periods as well. The conclusion appears unmistakable: on the
average, investors who sold at default suffered unnecessarily large
losses, and those who purchased obtained unusually large gains. It
is that many financial intermediaries were forced by
their directors or by regulatory authorities to sell at that time.
Clear-cut patterns again emerge in the experience records of
defaulted bonds classified by the various prospective measures of
bond quality at offering. As the table indicates, yields realized on
defaulted bonds purchased at offering and sold at default were
usually lower, the lower the prospective quality at offering. This re-
flects in part the price instability of low-grade bonds generally and
the concern of investors that the low grades might be treated un-
favorably in reorganizations. Since promised yields at offering were
higher for low than for high grades, the differences between the























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































022 INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY
the loss rate over that period) was largest for the low-grade issues.
On the other hand, the recovery of the low grades from default
to extinguishment was greater than that of high grades, so that
the returns obtained by those purchasing low grades at default
was greater. The net effect of the price decline from offering to
default and of the recovery from default to extinguishment was an
erratic pattern of life-span yields realized on defaulted bonds.
Generally speaking, yields realized on defaulted bonds from offer-
ing to extinguishment were not markedly different for the differ-
ent quality groups, although there was perhaps a tendency for
the very highest grades to yield higher returns than other issues.
In conclusion, it appears that some of the best buys in the bond
market during the period covered by the study were low-grade
bonds near the date of default. As the preceding section has
shown, low-grade bonds went into default more frequently than
high grades; but the yield realized was about the same for the
different quality groups. The higher returns obtained on low-
grade issues that did not go into default more than offset the lower
returns on defaulted bonds generally, so that for all issues com-
bined (defaults plus nondefaults) higher returns were obtained
on low-grade issues. Again, however, a word of admonition is in
order: these are aggregate results, not necessarily those obtained
by any particular investor.
TRENDS AND CYCLES IN CORPORATE BOND QUALITY
It is natural to ask whether the prospective and retrospective meas-
ures of bond quality reveal any significant trends or cycles over the
period studied. As we shall see, the answer is in the affirmative.
Secular Movements
Let us consider first secular movements in quality as reflected in
life-span default rates. These rates, plotted against year of offer-
ing, are presented in Chart 4 (Chapter 2). As the chart indicates,
life-span default rates averaged nearly 40 percent on bonds offered
during the first decade of the century, dropped to about 15 per-
cent in the early twenties, rose again to about 30 percent in
l928—33, and then moved irregularly downward to 1943. Similar
swings occurred in each of the major industry groups, but were
most pronounced for rails. Since there was a fairly regular progres-
sion in the direction of movement of the life-span default rates—
first downward, then upward, then downward again—there can beINTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY 23
little doubt as to the existence of secular waves of improvement
and deterioration in bond quality, considered retrospectively,
during the period studied.
It is broadly evident also that these waves were roughly synchro-
nous in timing with what Burns and Mitchell have identified as
turning points of major cycles. For example, Burns and Mitchell
tentatively placed long-period minima of the major cycles in 1908,
1921, and 1933, and we can detect dips in the default rate on new
offerings near the first two of those years. (On the basis of our
records, the default rates were in a downward trend from 1933 to
1943; but the true life-span default rates for that period cannot
be determined, since the extinguishment record for the majority
of the offerings is not available.)
One possible cause of the long swings in bond quality is sug-
gested by the lower sections of Chart 4, showing the net volume
of bond financing (total offerings less total extinguishments) and
the total volume of new-money offerings (total offerings less bond
refundings). It will be noted that the default rates reached highs
near years of heavy financing, lagging slightly. The general im-
pression is that the quantity as well as quality of bond financing
was related to the long swings in the investment cycle, possibly
because, in periods of overconfidence, marginal issues were floated
that would not have found a ready market when business was de-
pressed. The high level of investor confidence since World War
II, and the large and expanding volume of bond financing, raise
important questions as to the quality of bond credit in the post-
war period. Although our records do not cover this period—and
even if they did, a retrospective test of quality could not be under-
taken until the market had been subjected to a real test—the
record of the past is sufficiently strong to suggest the need for con-
stant review of bond market standards.
Secular trends are also identifiable in several of the prospective
measures of bond quality. For example, the proportion of the
total volume of new bond offerings with a high market rating
(below 1 percent; that is, with promised yields less than 1 percent
above those of the very best bonds with similar maturities) rose
rather regularly from a low of 2 percent in 1920 to a high of 62
percent in 1930. Throughout that period there was also substan-
tial upgrading of old issues by the market. The net volume of up-
grading, measured by the excess of outstanding issues moving into
the group with market ratings of under 1 percent over issues mov-24 INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY
ing out of that group, averaged about $1 billion annually in the
twenties, or about 5 percent annually of the total volume of
straight bond outstandings. The implication is that the risk pre-
miums in bond yields shrank progressively in the twenties as the
market became more buoyant.
It is to the credit of the investment rating agencies that, judged
both by the proportion of new bond offerings rated in the top four
grades, and by the volume of old issues upgraded, they did not
respond to the speculative fervor of the 1920's. Thus the propor-
tion of total rated offerings in the first four agency grades ranged
around 80 percent throughout most of the twenties with no ap-
parent trend, and dipped slightly below 75 percent in 1928 and
1929. Similarly, the net volume of upgrading by the agencies (ex-
cess of outstanding issues moving into the group rated i—Iv over
those moving Out of that group) dropped from a positive $1.2
billion in 1923 to a negative $0.3 billion in 1929 (the negative
figure indicating net downgrading). Thus the investment agen-
cies, unlike the market, did not lower their standards in the
twenties.
On the other hand, both the agencies and the market were
deeply responsive to the business contraction of 1929-32. The net
volume of downgrading by the market climbed to $3.0 billion in
1930 and to $7.1 billion in 1931, and the net volume downgraded
by the agencies exceeded $3.0 billion in both 1931 and 1932. As
subsequent events were to prove, much of this downgrading was
abortive, since many issues downgraded in the early thirties were
upgraded in the late thirties and early forties.
Cyclical Movements
During the shorter periods spanned by business cycles as identi-
fied in the National Bureau chronology, there is also evidence of
an ebb and flow of investor confidence. In this case, however, the
investment agencies proved more responsive than the market. The
net volume of bonds upgraded by the investment agencies ex-
panded in all six of the business expansions covered by our data,
and contracted in five of the six business contractions. Similar
data for the market rating show little sensitivity to business cycles.
Thus in ten cycles covered by the series on market rating, net up-
grading rose in five business expansions and declined in the other
five, and rose in three business contractions and declined in the
other seven.INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY 25
It is a curious fact that agency ratings should prove so sensitive
to the short-run ups and downs of business, since it is frequently
stated that they measure "intrinsi.c quality," which would seem
to imply a degree of permanence inconsistent with cyclical fluc-
tuations. In view of the conservatism of the investment agencies
in the 1920's, and the excellence of their long-term forecasts of
life-span default risk at offering, it is unlikely that they were af-
fected by changes in investor confidence during business cycles. A
more likely hypothesis, which we have not been able to verify
within the framework of our data, is that the cyclical behavior
of the ratings reflects the sensitivity of the various financial ratios
on which they are based. Partial support for this supposition is
provided by the fact that similar cyclical patterns were observed,
for example, in the volume of securities added to and deleted
from the Maine legal list, but failed to appear in the lists of
Massachusetts and New York. Of the three states, Maine was the
only one that applied the various earnings tests relentlessly
throughout the period studied. The other states set aside the earn-
ings tests through moratoria in the deep depression, and the vol-
ume of securities on their lists was insensitive to business cycles.
CONCLUSIONS
In this brief summary, it has been necessary to omit or touch lightly
upon detailed qualifications at many points. Students of the capi-
tal market will wish to refer to the text itself, or better yet, to the
supporting tables on which the text discussion rests. Brief sum-
maries are presented at the beginning of each chapter in the hope
that they will serve as useful guides to areas of special interest. As
a further guide, a few of the principal conclusions are listed at
this point:
(1) Life-span yields realized on the aggregate of bonds studied
equaled yields promised at offering, so that the net loss
rate, measured in current dollars, was zero.
(2) Capital gains, and capital losses, were substantial on bonds
offered and extinguished in different periods, and on out-
standings held over different assumed chronological in-
vestment periods.
(3) Although the over-all record of straight corporate bonds
was excellent, capital losses were large on bonds bought
during the buoyant twenties that were still outstanding in26 INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY
the thirties and thus subject to the heavy default risks of
the Great Depression.
(4) Agency ratings, market ratings, legal lists, and other Se-
lected indicators of prospective bond quality proved useful
guides in ranking bond offerings and outstandings in order
of the risk of subsequent default.
(5) The comprehensive record indicates that the principal ad-
vantages of a high-grade corporate bond portfolio are a low
default risk and loss rate, and comparative stability of
prices. The disadvantages are low promised yields, and,
over long investment periods, low realized rates of return.
(6) The principal advantages of a low-grade bond portfolio
are high promised yields, and, if the list is large and held
over a long period, high realized yields. The disadvantages
are high default and loss rates, and price instability.
(7)Forsmall investors, and those seeking liquidity in the bond
account, the advantages of a high-grade portfolio fre-
quently outweighed the disadvantages. For the very large
permanent investors holding well diversified portfolios,
the reverse frequently proved to be the case.
(8) Comparisons of the performance of bonds classified by the
various measures of prospective quality indicate that a list
meeting a fixed market-rating standard was less stable
than lists selected by agency ratings or legal status. The
obverse of the coin is that over short periods the market
rating was more sensitive to impending defaults than
agency ratings or legal lists.
(9) Corporate bonds were typically undervalued in the market
at or near the date of default. As a result, investors selling
at that time suffered large losses, while those purchasing
obtained correspondingly large gains.
(10) Because of the price instability of low-grade issues, realized
returns were usually lower on low grades than on high
grades when purchased at offering and sold at default, and
loss rates were correspondingly higher. Conversely, under
most rating systems, realized returns were higher on low
grades than on high grades when purchased at default
and held to extinguishment.
(11) Although life-span loss rates on defaulted bonds were
higher for low than for high grades, yields promised at
offering were also higher, so that the realized yields ob-INTRODUCTiON AND SUMMARY 27
tamed on the various quality groups of defaulted bonds
were about the same.
(12) The quality of corporate bond offerings and outstandings,
considered both prospectively and retrospectively, was
subject to secular and cyclical swings of substantial ampli-
tude, perhaps partly because of the behavior of corporate
earnings, and partly because of changes in investor con-
fidence.
(13) Judged by the differential behavior of selected groups of
bonds over selected periods, the errors in rating corporate
bonds can be traced principally to the business cycle and
to the difficulty of forecasting industry trends.
(14) Typical patterns of behavior, such as those outlined above,
emerge only when corporate bonds are viewed in broad
aggregates and over long investment periods. Wide dis-
parity of performance was the rule for minor groupings
and for bonds held over short investment periods.